The fiscal implications of a banking union.  Bruegel Policy Brief 2012/02, September 2012 by Pisani-Ferry, Jean & Wolff, Guntram B.
THE FISCAL
IMPLICATIONS OF A
BANKING UNION
bruegelpolicybrief
ISSUE 2012/02
SEPTEMBER 2012
by Jean Pisani-Ferry
Director of Bruegel
jean.pisani-ferry@bruegel.org
and Guntram B. Wolff
Deputy Director of Bruegel
guntram.wolff@bruegel.org
POLICY CHALLENGE
To be consistent, a banking union needs a common supervisor and common
resolution arrangements with the aim of reducing fiscal costs. At the same
time, arrangements for a common fiscal backstop need to be made. A robust
institutional set up, which also addresses incentive problems, is required for
credibility of banking union in case of a major crisis. Legacy problems should
be addressed head-on to reduce overall costs. Four options for a common
fiscal backstop could be
considered: a European
Resolution Fund, an ex-ante
burden-sharing agreement, the
European Stability Mechanism
(ESM) as a fiscal backstop, or
contingent European taxation.
Because the ESM is
operational, it would be the
preferable short-term option.
This Policy Brief is an edited and
abridged version of a paper presented
at the Informal ECOFIN meeting of
Finance Ministers in Nicosia, Cyprus
on 14 September 2012.
THE ISSUE Systemic banking crises are a threat to all countries whatever
their development level. They can entail major fiscal costs that can
undermine the sustainability of public finances. More than anywhere else,
however, a number of euro-area countries have been affected by a lethal
negative feedback loop between banking and sovereign risk, followed by
disintegration of the financial system, real economic fragmentation and the
exposure of the European Central Bank. Recognising the systemic dimension
of the problem, the Euro-Area Summit of June 2012 called for the creation of
a banking union with common supervision and the possibility for the
European Stability Mechanism to recapitalise banks directly.
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(2002) ‘The fiscal costs
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THE FIRST SENTENCE of the Euro
Area Summit Statement of 29 June
2012, “We affirm that it is impera-
tive to break the vicious circle
between banks and sovereigns”,
unambiguously specifies the moti-
vation for creating a banking union
in Europe. The overriding objective
is to remedy an acute fragility in
the euro area that was not fully
perceived before the 2010-12 cri-
sis. The potentially devastating
consequences of this fragility
have been illustrated by the paral-
lel increase in sovereign and bank
default risks, and the ongoing frag-
mentation of the euro-area finan-
cial market along national lines1.
But there is another possible moti-
vation for forming a banking union,
with significantly different fiscal
consequences. It is rooted in the
logic of completing the single mar-
ket, facilitating the resolution of
cross-border banking failures and
ensuring a level playing field in
competition among EU banks. This
logic underpinned the European
Commission's June 2012 propos-
als on the strengthening and
reform of the common EU banking
framework2. While there are good
reasons for this approach, the pri-
ority should be to repair the defi-
ciencies of Economic and
Monetary Union, and ensure the
stability of the European currency.
A banking union should also take
account of the EU member states
that are intending to join the single
currency, by making it possible for
them to participate where appro-
priate and to prepare for eventual
full membership.
The fiscal dimension is of second
order if one prioritises the single
market, but it is of paramount
importance for EMU. The notion of
a perverse feedback loop between
banks and sovereigns highlights
both the financial risk involved in
leaving banks under the responsi-
bility of fiscally weak sovereigns,
and the fiscal risk involved in let-
ting national governments alone
bear the responsibility for rescuing
the banks headquartered on their
territories.
The rationale for forming a banking
union is to minimise these twin
risks through a common insurance
system that breaks the feedback
loop, thereby reducing both the
frequency and incidence of sys-
temic banking crises. The design of
the new regime, its credibility and
its consistency will determine if
there will actually be fewer, less
severe banking crises. This will
also depend on all actors being
given the right incentives to
behave prudently.
THE FISCAL DIMENSIONS OF
BANKING CRISES
Systemic banking crises entail
potentially huge fiscal costs.
Implicit or explicit state guaran-
tees to banking systems represent
major contingent liabilities, the
materialisation of which could
jeopardise sovereign solvency. To
the extent that markets expect this
BOX 1: FISCAL CONSEQUENCES OF BANKING CRISES
Banking crises tend to occur more frequently in developing economies, but are longer-lasting and deeper in
developed economies. According to the IMF3, the average duration, output loss relative to trend and direct fis-
cal costs of all banking crises between 1970-2011 were three years, 33 percent (cumulated output loss)
and 3.8 percent (direct fiscal cost) of GDP for advanced economies. Other studies find similar results4. For the
current crisis, the IMF data shows that at end-2011 the cumulated output loss in the euro area amounted to
23 percent while the direct fiscal cost was estimated to be 3.9 percent of GDP.
Figure 1: Fiscal cost of banking crises, 1970-2011,
advanced economies
Source: Bruegel using the Laeven and Valencia (2012) database (see footnote 3).
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One of the main determinants of the fiscal cost of
crises is the resolution policies that are applied.
Empirical evidence suggests that resolution poli-
cies that included open-ended liquidity support,
regulatory forbearance and an unlimited deposi-
tor guarantee added a significant fiscal cost5. For
example, Japanese forbearance in the 1990s and
the early 2000s resulted in magnifying fiscal
costs and prolonging economic stagnation,
whereas swift Swedish resolution in 1991-92 had
the opposite effects.
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Central Bank). For more
on fiscal costs of bank-
ing crises, see Hog-
garth, G., R. Reis and V.
Saporta (2002) ‘Cost of
banking system insta-
bility: some empirical
evidence’, Journal of
Banking and Finance,
26:5, 825-855.
5. See Honohan, P. and
D. Klingebiel (2000)
‘Controlling fiscal costs
of banking crises”, Pol-
icy Research Working
Paper 2441, World
Bank.
threat to materialise, the fiscal risk
may lead them to price a sovereign
default. Actual public finance costs
result from assistance provided to
financial institutions through
recapitalisation and the liability
guarantees (the direct fiscal cost)
and from foregone tax revenues or
additional expenditures implied
by the adverse economic impact
of banking crises (the indirect fis-
cal cost). International Monetary
Fund data indicates that
economies of very unequal devel-
opment level can be subject to
such shocks (Box 1).
Box 1 notes that the resolution
regime is of central importance to
minimise the economic and fiscal
costs of banking crises. In particu-
lar, the extent to which costs can
be distributed to private creditors
matters considerably. It would be
an illusion, however, to believe
that together with adequate micro-
and macro-prudential supervision,
a properly designed resolution
regime can eliminate the fiscal
risk. There are circumstances
when the commitment of signifi-
cant amounts of public money is
the best or even the only econom-
ically efficient way to contain the
consequences of a banking crisis.
Access to budgetary resources in
case of need is therefore an essen-
tial part of financial stability.
Resources must be sufficient to
cover direct re-capitalisations and
bail-outs, and also guarantees that
help prevent bank runs. Even if the
guarantees are not called on, they
can affect market perceptions of
sovereign solvency. A credible fis-
cal backstop is therefore an indis-
pensable element of any crisis
management and resolution
regime.
WHY BANKING UNION SHOULD
CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING FISCAL
VULNERABILITIES
The crisis has revealed that under
conditions of financial stress,
participation in monetary union
magnified existing fragilities and
the corresponding threats to fiscal
and financial stability. In turn,
increased worries about public
finance sustainability and the
health of national banking
systems contribute to financial
fragmentation, to the emergence
of large disparities in funding
conditions for banks and non-
financial agents such as
households and SMEs, and
ultimately to the reinforcement of
the very vulnerabilities at the root
of market concerns. This vicious
circle is a potentially lethal threat
the common currency
In vulnerable countries, the market
assessment of banks and
sovereign default risks are highly
correlated (Figure 2). Over time,
the correlation has been very high
in Spain and Italy while it is
virtually non-existent in Germany.
Similarly to Germany, there is very
little correlation between banking
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Figure 2: 5-year credit default swap risk premia on sovereigns and banks in selected countries
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and sovereign risk in the United
States and the United Kingdom –
despite, in the US case at least, a
strong deterioration of bank
default risks at the time of the
global financial crisis.
In all countries, a potential feed-
back loop exists. Banks are
exposed to sover-
eigns because of their
domestic government
bonds portfolios and
their exposure to the
domestic economy,
and because the
value of the implicit
government guarantee they bene-
fit from diminishes when the sov-
ereign’s solvency is put into
question. Sovereigns are exposed
to banks precisely because of this
guarantee and the indirect fiscal
cost of a financial crisis. In addi-
tion, there are several reasons why
bank stress and sovereign stress
are more correlated in the weaker
euro-area countries:
• Correlation only sets in if mar-
kets assess sovereign default
risk as significant. It does not
show up if the fiscal position is
strong, or if banking sector trou-
bles have limited fiscal conse-
quences.
• The credit risk borne by banks
is more diversified in the US
than in European economies
where exposure is strongly
geared towards domestic loans
and assets. This renders Euro-
pean banks vulnerable to
strong national cycles6, includ-
ing in the mortgage market.
• Banks in the US and the UK hold
fewer securities issued by their
own governments than most
euro-area banks. In 2011, 2
percent of US Treasury securi-
ties were held by domestic
banks, compared to about 10
percent in the UK and the
Netherlands, 15 percent in
France, Italy and Ireland, and
20 percent or more in Greece,
Portugal, Germany and Spain.
• Bank refinancing by the Euro-
pean Central Bank through the
three-year long-term refinanc-
ing operation has alle-
viated concerns over
bank funding but has
increased banks'
exposure to their own
sovereign7.Liquidity
provisioning is not a
structural response to
the fragility and debt overhang
exhibited in the crisis;
• Resolution policies that impose
the greatest part of the cost on
private bank creditors reduce
the fiscal risk. In the US, there
have been on average 90 bank
closures per year since 2008,
but reported fiscal costs since
the onset of the crisis have
been limited8.
• Participation in a monetary
union increases the sovereign
default risk on the face value of
debt because monetary policy
does not react to country-spe-
cific solvency fears and debt is
not monetised9. Threats to pub-
lic finance sustainability,
including those arising from
bank bailout risks, therefore
translate into sovereign sol-
vency risk instead of giving rise
to expectations of exchange-
rate depreciation and inflation.
Some of these vulnerability factors
are independent from participa-
tion in a currency union and can
therefore be addressed sepa-
rately. But some are inherent to it.
Hence, there is an overwhelming
case for complementing EMU in a
way that will strengthen its
resilience. A banking union should
help reduce the negative feedback
loop in three ways:
• By protecting individual sover-
eigns from the adverse feed-
back loop.
• By pooling risk. Increasing the
number of insured banks with
different, partially uncorrelated
credit risks will make it less
likely that banking risk
becomes so large that sover-
eign risk increases, reducing
the potential for major crises to
develop.
• By facilitating bail-ins. Resolu-
tion authorities currently have
to consider the risk that bailing-
in private creditors will acceler-
ate capital flight. A banking
union should reduce country-
specific risk so that the Euro-
pean authority can more easily
impose losses on private credi-
tors of banks without undermin-
ing financial stability. A well
designed banking union could
therefore also reduce the global
fiscal cost by increasing credi-
tor involvement.
In addition, a banking union would
help equalise funding conditions
for banks and therefore for ulti-
mate borrowers of same creditwor-
thiness. This would help repair the
transmission of monetary policy
and reduce disparities across
countries.
It should be kept in mind, however,
that a well-designed banking
union would not address the asset
side of the problem. Vulnerabilities
arising from the banks’ high expo-
sure to country-specific credit risk
and sovereign default should be
addressed through different
means – banking market integra-
tion, regulatory limits to single-
6. Angeloni, Chiara and
Guntram B. Wolff
(2012) ‘Are banks
affected by their hold-
ings of government
debt?’, Working Paper
2012/07, Bruegel.
7. See the Bruegel
dataset on sovereign
bond holdings,
available at
www.bruegel.org. 
8. The full list of failed
and assisted banks of
FDIC is available at:
http://www.fdic.gov/ban
k/individual/failed/bank
list.html.
9. See De Grauwe, P.
(2011) ‘The Gover-
nance of a Fragile Euro-
zone’, Working
Document 346, CEPS.
‘A banking union
would help repair
monetary policy
transmission and
reduce disparities.’
br
ue
ge
lp
ol
ic
yb
ri
ef
05
10. See, for example,
Pisani-Ferry, Jean, André
Sapir, Nicolas Véron,
Guntram B. Wolff (2012)
‘What kind of European
banking union?’, Policy
Contribution 2012/12,
Bruegel.
11. This approach would
also raise potential com-
petitive distortions, and
would imply different
benefits across coun-
tries, for a detailed
description, see ibid.
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addition to practical obstacles:
• Even though deposit guarantee
systems have the same aims,
their organisation differs signif-
icantly across and even within
countries. 
• Resolution involves the closing
or absorption of financial insti-
tutions, which is organised dif-
ferently in a heterogeneous
legal system, for example in
relation to bankruptcy and
labour laws.
• The complete pooling of the
potential fiscal costs of banking
crises would create incentives
for countries to support the
development of oversized
banking sectors, because
potential losses would be
socialised, while benefits in
terms of jobs, profits and credit
would remain mostly national.
Supervision is of vital importance.
Distribution of supervisory respon-
sibilities largely drives the degree
of centralisation in other fields. It is
also where the Euro Summit took
the clearest stance. One issue that
is still heavily debated concerns
the number of banks to be covered
by common supervision, with sug-
gestions ranging from 20 and
6000 banks. Clearly, staff located
at the staff located at the ECB can-
not supervise all European banks
directly. At the same time, limiting
the scope of banking union to the
very small number of banks that
are systemic at European scale
would be insufficient to break the
sovereign-banking feedback
loop11. However the real choice is
not between 20 and 6000. The
largest 200 banks represent more
than 95 percent of bank assets in
the euro area (Figure 3). This sug-
gests a regime in which legal
responsibility for supervising all
banks is given to the ECB, but
supervision of the smallest is dele-
gated to national authorities. The
implementation of monetary pol-
icy decisions within the Eurosys-
tem and antitrust enforcement
within the European Competition
Network are two examples of cen-
tralised decision-making powers
combined with a degree of decen-
tralisation in implementation.
The relevance of deposit insurance
seems to have been somewhat
overemphasised in recent
borrower exposure, or the creation
of Eurobonds – which are beyond
the scope of this paper. 
THE STRUCTURE OF A BANKING
UNION
Banking union relies on a single
rulebook for the whole of the EU
and involves four pillars10:
• Supervision of financial institu-
tions;
• Deposit insurance;
• Resolution of failing banks or
systemic banking crises; 
• A (common) fiscal backstop. 
These pillars are closely linked. A
consistent approach therefore
suggests allocating them to the
same level of governance. For
example, if bank supervision is
organised at European level, cen-
tral resolution functions should be
allocated to the same level. Other-
wise, the national resolution
authority may argue that it has to
act because of supervisory fail-
ures at European level and that it
lacks appropriate information.
Similarly, national taxpayers
would not agree to a system that
would make them pay for the
faults of a European institution
over which they have no control. It
is also easy to imagine cases in
which the European supervisor
would withdraw a given institu-
tion’s banking licence, forcing
national resolution and the com-
mitment of public money, whereas
national authorities would have
preferred forbearance. Making
national taxpayers pay for the con-
sequences of a decision their gov-
ernment opposes would be a
recipe for trouble.
At the same time there are obsta-
cles to complete centralisation, in
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Figure 3: Distribution by assets and deposit size of the euro-area
banking sector
discussions. Pre-funding of
Deposit Guarantee Schemes
(DGSs) through contributions from
the banking sector currently
amounts to only a few tenths of a
percent of GDP. These funds insure
depositors against the failure of a
single, small financial institution
but are vastly insufficient in case
of a systemic crisis. Deposit
insurance cannot credibly insure
against threats to the integrity of
the euro area. From a fiscal
standpoint, DGS centralisation is
therefore a second-order issue.
The case for further harmonising
and centralising deposit insurance
rests on consumer protection and
financial stability arguments: the
more European bank customers
will benefit from the same
protection, the lower the risk of a
deposit run. There is also a valid
pooling argument: the more
centralised the DGS, the lower the
probability that it will be
exhausted in a crisis. Concerns
about the organisation of deposit
insurance should not stand in the
way of a meaningful banking
union.
The organisation of resolution
involves trade-offs. The logic of
centralising resolution is com-
pelling once supervision is cen-
tralised, but full centralisation
would require significant changes
in national insolvency, labour and
tax laws.  In principle, banks could
fall as any other corporation under
normal insolvency law. Yet, the
special function of banks suggests
that different mechanisms should
be installed to be able to preserve
the parts of banks that have vital
functions for the broader econ-
omy. Yet different national sys-
tems confer different powers to
authorities to wind down financial
institutions in a special resolution
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12. Reinhart, C. and K.
Rogoff (2008) ‘Banking
Crises: An Equal Oppor-
tunity Menace’, Working
Paper 14587, NBER.
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framework. Some countries do not
even have an explicit bank resolu-
tion framework. The European
Commission proposal for a new
directive therefore aims at har-
monising EU national resolution
frameworks, and creating rules for
the resolution of cross-border
banks.
However, a fully harmonised sys-
tem of rules with resolution still
being exercised at a national level
would not suffice for a banking
union.  Even with fully harmonised
rules, national authorities may
apply differing interpretations.
They may distribute losses
between creditors and taxpayers
differently. A common European
fiscal backstop would create the
incentive for the national authori-
ties to shift burdens onto the Euro-
pean taxpayer. Ultimately, a
common fiscal backstop will there-
fore require a much higher degree
of centralisation of bank resolution
than envisaged in the Commis-
sion's June 2012 proposals.
OPTIONS FOR A COMMON FISCAL
BACKSTOP
European banking union requires
agreement on the fiscal backstop
that would be needed in case of a
systemic crisis. As shown recently
by Ireland, banking crises can be
extremely costly. It is not suffi-
cient to envisage the pooling of
limited resources such as deposit
guarantee funds or a specially
designed small resolution fund,
while leaving the public finances
in individual member states at the
mercy of the tail risk of a cata-
strophic event. The status quo –
national organisation of the fiscal
backstop – is inconsistent with a
financially integrated single cur-
rency area. It would not break the
sovereign-bank feedback loop; it
would not tackle financial frag-
mentation and the resulting real
economic fragmentation; and it
would leave intact the banks’
dependence on ECB liquidity. Also
a broad but unspecific agreement
to share the burdens of future
crises would be insufficient: the
availability of resources would be
subject to ex-post agreement by
national decision makers, and
would therefore lack credibility.
The organisation of a backstop
nevertheless raises important
questions.
• Would common insurance lead
to a distributional bias of tax
resources from some countries
to others? The empirical
evidence does not suggest it
would. As pointed out by
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008)12,
banking crises are “an equal
opportunity menace” that can
affect all countrie s rich and
poor.
• What incentives would a com-
mon fiscal backstop create?
The introduction of insurance
creates moral hazard. The pool-
ing of risk at a European level
would give countries a greater
incentive to run irresponsible
banking policies because
potential losses can be
socialised while the benefits in
terms of jobs and credit would
mostly be national. A robust
system needs to deal with this
incentive problem. 
• How would contributions to the
common insurance be shared?
In principle, contributions
should be commensurate to
risk.
These questions suggest that a
common fiscal backstop requires
centralised supervision and reso-
lution to mitigate the moral hazard
problem. Moreover, ex-ante contri-
butions to resolution and contribu-
tions to the fiscal backstop should
be linked to the size of the banking
sector in the country. Finally, even
with a fully cen-
tralised supervision
and resolution frame-
work, other still-
national policies
matter for banking-
sector risk. Therefore,
national taxpayers
should always be partly liable for
fiscal casualties. The exact distri-
bution between the national and
the supranational fiscal backstop
should be based on clear ex-ante
rules.
Against this background, there are
several options:
A European Resolution Fund
A common resolution fund cali-
brated to cover a large proportion
of potential banking crises costs
could be created. Contributions to
the fund would be paid in over 10-
20 years to build up a fund of, say
5 percent of euro-area GDP. The
contributions could come from a
levy based on the assets of finan-
cial institutions.
This option would have a number
of advantages. To start with, poten-
tial resources from the financial
sector are available to this end13.
Second, a pre-funded scheme
would be very credible and the
immediate availability of
resources would mitigate banking
panics.
However, there are potential short-
comings. First, under current cir-
cumstances one may question the
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13. There have even
been discussions on the
value of taxing the finan-
cial sector on purely
Pigouvian grounds, ie to
limit excessive financial
development rather than
to raise revenues. See
International Monetary
Fund (2010) ‘A fair and
substantial contribution
by the financial sector’,
in Financial Sector Taxa-
tion: The IMF’s Report to
the G20 and Background
Material, edited by Stijn
Claessens, Michael Keen
and Ceyla
Pazarbasioglou.
14. Government bonds
cannot be used for such
a purpose precisely
because in times of
banking crisis one wants
to prevent government
firesales. Assets in
countries outside the
euro area suffer from
being subject to
exchange rate risk. Only
gold appears to have the
right properties for times
of financial crisis.
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wisdom of accumulating in a fund
instead of reducing public debt.
Second, a fund of such size would
have difficulties finding safe
assets that can be liquidated in cri-
sis times14. Third, a fund of even
significant size cannot provide a
full guarantee. Over-
all, the idea of a fund
deserves considera-
tion but it seems
unlikely that the EU
will agree on estab-
lishing in the short to
medium run a fund of
sufficient size. Until it is estab-
lished, other fiscal resources will
be needed.
An ex-ante burden-sharing
agreement
Ex-ante agreement on distributing
the fiscal costs of banking crises
would consist of a clear rule
spelling out how much of the cost
would be borne by taxpayers of
the country in which the bank is
located and how much by the tax-
payers of the European partners.
The rule could be based on the ECB
capital key or a variant of it taking
into account the size of each coun-
try’s banking sector. A clear gover-
nance structure would be needed
to call in the national resources.
This solution, however, would
make the intervention capacity
dependent on ex-post approval by
the participating states. Experi-
ence with assistance to countries
in distress has shown the limits of
such schemes. Burden-sharing
therefore entails the risk that
states, which retain the ultimate
decision, will backtrack from com-
mitments. An ex-ante agreement
therefore requires strong institu-
tions in order to be time consistent
and credible ex-post.
The European Stability Mechanism
as a fiscal backstop
Also the EFSF/ESM could serve as a
fiscal backstop. If all of the
resources available in the ESM
were to be allocated to that pur-
pose, the European Financial Sta-
bility Facility/ESM would
sufficiently large to cover the
median direct fiscal cost of a bank-
ing crisis of about 4 percent of GDP
(see Box 1). However, the option
has disadvantages. First, many
banking crises cost significantly
more. Second, in current condi-
tions the EFSF/ESM cannot provide
the ex-ante guarantees (or blanket
guarantees) that may need to be
given to prevent a generalised
panic. The big advantage of the
EFSF/ESM option, however, would
be that the institution is already
being established, that it has
resources and that burden-sharing
agreements are in place. Moreover,
it has strong governance mecha-
nisms that make it able to take
swift decisions in emergencies.
Under current arrangements the
EFSF/ESM option would fall short
of providing the guarantee that
may become necessary in excep-
tionally adverse cases. It has, how-
ever, the big advantage of being
operational and is therefore our
preferred short-term option.
Contingent European taxation
The euro area could be granted a
limited and contingent taxation
capacity. This would create the
capacity to raise resources to pay
for bank resolution, and would also
imply the creation of an institution
that could issue a credible guaran-
tee in case of a major systemic
banking confidence crisis. It is,
therefore, a desirable long-term
‘Euro-area taxa-
tion capacity
would create the
resources to pay for
bank resolution.’
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option. In the short run, however,
this solution is unlikely to com-
mand broad enough support
within the EU, and would require
significant advancement in terms
of EU governance and democratic
legitimacy.
DEALING WITH THE LEGACY
Introducing a common fiscal back-
stop in the current situation is
made difficult by legacy condi-
tions: some banking systems are
in worse shape than others; some
sovereigns are more at risk than
others; some countries have
already drawn on euro-area assis-
tance while others have con-
tributed. In this context a few
points deserve short discussion.
First, delaying resolution
increases the size of the problem.
Forbearance is very costly, as
Japan found out in the 1990s and
2000s15. The sooner European
decision makers agree to act and
distribute the burden of the cur-
rent crisis, the lower the overall
cost will be. Unfortunately, Europe
is already experiencing a Japan-
ese-style scenario in which bank
losses are not recognised and
overall credit provisioning to the
real economy is subdued for a pro-
longed period.
Second, fairness requires that
legacy costs should be borne by
creditors and governments that
failed to exercise appropriate sur-
veillance. The creation of a fiscal
backstop should therefore ideally
not apply to existing problems but
rather to future ones. The mutuali-
responsible for bailing out banks
(this option, however, would be
insufficient to break the sovereign
banking feedback loop)16.
CONCLUSIONS
The creation of a European bank-
ing union is a major endeavour. The
euro area is characterised by the
particular weakness that banking
and sovereign risk is mutually
reinforcing. A viable banking union
requires common supervision, a
strong common resolution frame-
work and a common fiscal back-
stop because, while good bank
resolution policies with creditor
bail-in are central to reducing fiscal
costs, they cannot fully eliminate
them. A mechanism for a common
fiscal backstop is therefore
needed and its design should min-
imise perverse incentives. Beyond
the actual fiscal costs of banking
crises, arrangements need to be
found under which implicit or
explicit government guarantees
can be provided to backstop the
financial system.
As the creation of a meaningful
banking union has far-reaching
consequences for resolution
policies and fiscal policy, a strong
and robust governance system
needs to be put in place. In
particular, clear decision-making
power needs to be allocated so
that decisions about bank
resolution and about distribution
of costs are taken quickly and
effectively. Moreover, the
democratic legitimacy of those
decisions needs to be
strengthened significantly.
15. See European Sys-
temic Risk Board (2012)
‘Reports of the Advisory
Scientific Committee –
Forbearance, resolution
and deposit insurance’,
No. 1, July.
16. Pisani-Ferry et al
(2012), cited in footnote
10, includes a more
developed discussion,
especially of the
screening process.
sation of legacy costs may never-
theless be warranted. Banking
problems in some countries
express to some extent a common
failure. For example, the absence
of a common supervisor has
allowed for regulatory arbitrage
which has effectively put limits on
the scope of national supervisors
in some countries to prevent
excess risks. Also, unresolved
banking problems in some parts of
the monetary union have negative
repercussions on the union as a
whole. When banking problems
cause a sovereign debt crisis, a
much more significant financial
stability risk emerges which also
affects strong countries. Finally,
legacy costs that prove too high
may eventually be mutualised one
way or another. Concerted support
is probably preferable to sovereign
debt restructuring or inflation.
Applying a common fiscal back-
stop to legacy problems requires
careful design. Robust screening
must be done, with a neutral insti-
tution assessing the overall cost of
the problems accumulated in indi-
vidual banks and national banking
systems. Once this is established,
the legacy cost will need to be dis-
tributed so that incentives for good
policy are preserved. there are dif-
ferent options: allocate the first
loss always to the national tax-
payer (the fiscal backstop would
step in only if costs exceed the
threshold beyond which national
sovereign solvency is endan-
gered); burden-sharing starting
with the first euro of loss; provide
backstop to governments that
would still be held uniquely
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